Given the exponential increase on use of mobile devices, mobile data offloading has become a topic of significant interest to both researchers and operators. In this paper, the authors relate their participation experience in the Mobile Ad Hoc Networking Interoperability and Cooperation (MANIAC) Challenge 2013 -possibly the first attempt to encourage real-world implementation. Researchers were invited to develop and comparatively evaluate strategies to offload infrastructure access points via customer ad hoc forwarding using handheld devices. The authors participated in this event by proposing a deadline based strategy and introduced the concept of how "tight" a node is to successfully deliver a packet to its destination. The reviewers had some concerns regarding novelty of the schemes and performance outcome of the strategies. However, the final version of the paper focused on take home messages from these experiments and suggestions for improvement of future events. 
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Networks: The Tightness Strategy
INTRODUCTION
The advent of mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets have posed an unprecedent traffic demand on current mobile communications infrastructure. For instance, AT&T has reported that wireless data traffic has increased by 20,000% in just five years (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , and that an exponential traffic increase should be expected in the years to come [1] . Following similar reports, mobile operators have started to look for alternative solutions to alleviate the impact of the so-called "mobile data crunch" problem. As an immediate (and partial) solution to this problem, many operators are currently deploying their own WiFi networks to offload their core network infrastructure by encouraging their customers to switch to WiFi as much as possible. Given the importance and scale of the problem, data offloading has become an active area of research in the past few years [2, 3, 4, 5] .
Motivated by this timely and important issue, the organizers of the Mobile Ad Hoc Networking Interoperability and Cooperation (MANIAC) Challenge 2013 [6] have called for the development and comparative evaluation of strategies to offload infrastructure access points via customer ad hoc forwarding using handheld devices (e.g., smartphones and tablets). In this year's challenge, competing teams should come together to form a wireless ad hoc network while simultaneously connected to a backbone of access points. Then, traffic from the backbone would be generated and destined to some other backbone node. A hop-by-hop bidding contest should decide the path of each data packet towards its destination, and each team should rely on other teams' willingness to forward traffic for them in order to get their traffic across the network. In this application scenario, the incentive for customers to participate in the ad hoc network is discounted monthly fees, while operators would benefit from decreased infrastructure costs. Ultimately, the main goal of the MANIAC Challenge 2013 was to demonstrate scenarios/strategies that do not degrade user experience while offering significant mobile data offloading on the infrastructure.
This paper presents a strategy that was designed, implemented, and presented at the MANIAC Challenge 2013. The main idea behind the proposed strategy is based on the concept of how "tight" a node is to successfully deliver a packet to its target destination within a given deadline. This "tightness" concept is built upon a shortest-path analysis of the underlying network graph, and it is used to define three sub-strategies for participation in the ad hoc network: the bidding strategy, which sets the bid for an auction based on the budget, fine, timeout, and target destination announced by the auctioneer; the budget-and-fine setup strategy, which sets the budget and fine for every auction the node announces (in case it needs to forward a packet to someone else); and the request-for-bids strategy, which decides who wins an auction the node performs based on received bids.
In addition, we have included another feature to the strategy based on observed competitors' behavior during the MA-NIAC Challenge 2013. This additional feature seeks to promote cooperation within the network by penalizing selfish or greedy behavior. In fact, in order to convince other clients to join the ad hoc network and share their handheld resources (bandwidth, battery life, etc.), it is fundamental that every participant node perceives some level of fairness and profit sharing within the network in the long term. Otherwise, clients may not feel encouraged to participate in the ad hoc network and, as a result, they may decide to leave it or never join it. Such an effect may compromise the feasibility of the proposed offloading architecture due to severe network partitions and/or poor geographical coverage.
In the following, we present the strategy without addressing its performance in the competition. Unfortunately, the data gathered by the organizers could not be made publicly available for off-line performance evaluation and analysis.
In spite of that, the paper details the challenge rules and how it was run, so that the network community may understand and learn from this experience. It also discusses some learned lessons and suggestions for future events. The code of the strategy, as well as the code from other strategies and the challenge's setup, is freely available for download [7] .
The paper is divided as follows. Section 2 describes the rules and setup of the MANIAC Challenge 2013. The "tightness" strategy is described in Section 3, and Section 4 contains a discussion on learned lessons from participation in the challenge. Finally, Section 5 contains the conclusions.
CHALLENGE RULES & SETUP
The general goal of the MANIAC Challenge is to better understand cooperation and interoperability in ad hoc networks. Therefore, the main idea of the challenge is to put together competing teams of students/researchers to form a wireless ad hoc network, while simultaneously connected to a backbone of access points. Figure 1 depicts a typical scenario of a MANIAC Challenge, where the lines connecting the devices indicate wireless connectivity, and the arrows indicate a path that would be taken by a packet to traverse the ad hoc network from some source access point (AP) to a target AP destination. Each team could compete with two tablets only. Also, because the tablets were two Google Nexus 7, all strategies had to be implemented for the Android Mobile OS. To help with strategy implementation, the organizers have also made available the "MANIAC framework," which included an API that provided function calls for "bidding," for "auction," for sending and receiving data, and for accessing topology and routing information through the Optimized Link-State Routing (OLSR) protocol [8] . In particular, the teams were allowed to override the forwarding decisions made by the OLSR routing protocol in order to implement their forwarding strategies in the hop-by-hop bidding contests.
The competition was based on multiple rounds, where each round consisted of multiple games. After each round, all teams were allowed to refine their strategy. The organizers monitored every packet launched to the network, and collected statistical data to analyze each game and to identify nodes that did not comply with the rules. Two winning categories were defined for the challenge: performance, based on both maximum balance above zero and highest packet delivery ratio, and design, where a subjective evaluation would select the most inspiring idea. In the following, we detail the rules that were laid out for this challenge.
Bidding
Each game starts with a randomly selected backbone access point (AP) initiating a forwarding request to deliver one data packet to another randomly selected AP. In each bidding request, the source AP indicates:
• Maximum budget available for the successful delivery of the data packet;
• Maximum packet delivery time (i.e., "timeout") translated to a maximum number of hops that the particular packet could traverse;
• A fine to be paid in case of unsuccessful packet delivery to its destination.
All neighbors that are able to overhear a bidding request are obligated to bid their price lower or equal than the announced budget to forward the data packet. All bids are open, in the sense that they can be detected and understood by anyone within range of the node that sent the bid. After sending a bidding request, every auctioneer must wait for 3 s before broadcasting the auction winner. The initial upstream node (i.e., the AP source) always selects the bid with the lowest cost. From this point on, per packet hop-by-hop recursive auctions should be performed in order to decide each data packet's next hop towards destination. Each handheld device must deliver the packet to the destination either via the ad hoc network or the provider's infrastructure backbone based on independent bidding. Using the backbone for delivery guarantees a 100% packet delivery ratio. Each backbone node is reachable within radio range of at least one handheld, and the handheld topology is not partitioned. Handheld devices are free to advertise their own maximum budget and fine in their bidding requests, except for the timeout, which has to be the same as the one set by the source AP. However, in all auctions, the advertised fine should be smaller or equal to the fine agreed upon for the previous hop. After receiving the bids, the handheld device can choose a winner downstream node based on its own strategy. A node that wins an auction is allowed to drop the packet it has just received based on its own strategy. In order to avoid loops, a handheld device is not allowed to bid for a data packet it has already forwarded once.
Payment
An upstream node pays the accepted price to the chosen downstream node if the packet has been successfully delivered to the final destination. If the data packet does not make it to the backbone destination before timeout, the chosen downstream node must pay the agreed fine to the upstream node. As mentioned before, the initial data packet budget, the associated fine, and timeout are predefined, per packet, by the organizers. In all auctions, the fine must be lower or equal to the budget defined in the bidding request. A handheld's balance may be temporarily negative. A handheld that bypass the ad hoc network by using the backbone must pay a price equal to the initial maximum data packet budget (when the data packet was first introduced in the network). The fine has to be paid in case of unsuccessful packet delivery (i.e., packet loss or exceeding the packet delivery time).
THE TIGHTNESS STRATEGY
In this section, we define the proposed strategy, which comprises three sub-strategies: the bidding strategy, the budget-and-fine setup strategy, and the request-for-bids setup strategy. Before going into details about each sub-strategy, we explain the nomenclature and definitions used in this work.
Nomenclature and Definitions
When the source access point (AP) announces its request for bids (RFB), it announces its budget B0, along with a fine F0 to be paid in case the data packet is not delivered to the destination AP after traversing a maximum number H0 of hops (i.e., this is the "timeout" announced by the source AP, as mentioned before). Let hci denote the number of hops (or "hop count") of the shortest path (in terms of number of hops) computed from node i to the destination AP. Also, let p k denote the number of hops traversed by a packet from the source AP to a given node k in the network.
A key metric in our proposal is the definition of a "tightness function" ∆i for a node i in the network, i.e., ∆i measures how "tight" a node i is with respect to making the deadline H0 imposed by the source AP. More specifically, given the timeout H0 announced by the source AP, and the number pu of hops already traversed by the data packet all the way to node i's upstream node u (i.e., node i's predecessor, the one who will issue an RFB), ∆i measures the "surplus" or "deficit" (in number of hops) that node i possess with respect to timeout H0 if the data packet were forwarded through its shortest path to the destination AP, given by
where N (u) is the set of nodes who are able to overhear the RFB from node u, i.e., the neighbors of node u. The computation of ∆i requires the knowledge of the underlying network topology (the OLSR routing protocol provides that), and the use of any shortest path algorithm. Notice that, if ∆i < 0, node i cannot deliver the data packet within the deadline (even if the data packet follows node i's shortest path to the destination AP). On the other hand, if ∆i = 0, node i needs exactly the number of hops contained in its shortest path to the destinatio AP in order to make the deadline. This is a "tight" situation for node i, since it relies on the unpredicted outcome of other downstream auctions for the packet to arrive within the deadline. Finally, if ∆i > 0, node i has a higher chance to deliver the data packet within the deadline because the packet may even deviate from its shortest path to the destination AP, but it has a "surplus" of hops before the deadline is up.
The Bidding Strategy
The bidding strategy defines how the value of the bid is set once an RFB is overheard from an upstream node u. For that, we first need to determine the set N (u) of neighbors of the upstream node u. This set contains our competitors in the upcoming auction, and it can be easily found because all nodes have complete knowledge of the network topology. For each node i ∈ N (u), we compute ∆i according to Eq. (1). Based on the values of ∆i, we create a subset S(u) ⊆ N (u) that contains all nodes in N (u) such that ∆i ≥ 0, i.e., the set S(u) contains all nodes that are actually able to deliver the packet within the deadline and, therefore, they are the ones most likely to win the auction announced by node u (our actual competitors). Observe that, we are assuming that node u will usually prefer not to pay a fine.
Given S(u), we want to estimate how competitive we are in terms of packet delivery from the point of view of node u. It is reasonable to expect that the likelihood of successfully delivering a packet will play a key role in any decision making by any node. Therefore, we choose to find out how competitive we are by using our "tightness function." Specifically, we compute how "tight" we are with respect to the average tightness ∆ of nodes in S(u), defined as
where |S(u)| is the cardinality of S(u), and hc is the average optimal hop count over all i ∈ S(u), i.e., the average shortest path to the destination AP computed for each node i ∈ S(u).
Once the average tightness ∆ is found, we can compute our relative tightness cn with respect to ∆ by
where the subscript n is used to identify ourselves. It is important to mention that the above computation will only happen if our tightness function is such that ∆n > 0 and |S(u)| > 0. Otherwise, we have specific rules for making our bid (explained later).
Observe that, if cn < 1 and ∆n > 0, our competitors are better positioned than us (on average, with respect to a surplus of hop counts). Therefore, there is a high chance that they become more aggressive to win the bidding, since they may feel that they can deliver the packet in time. At the same time, since cn < 1, it means that we are running a higher risk in not having the packet delivered to its final destination, compared to others. Therefore, we may want to set a higher bid (closer to the budget Bu) because the risk should not be worth it to take. In case cn ≈ 1, we have similar conditions than other competitors and, therefore, we should try to win the auction with a lower bid compared to previous case. However, if cn > 1, it means that we are better positioned than the average of our competitors. Therefore, we should strive to win the bid by offering a very attractive price (closer to the fine Fu).
In additon to cn, another important metric to take into account is how ∆n (the value of our tightness function) compares to the highest value of ∆i for i ∈ S(u). This is because, if ∆n > max i∈S(u) ∆i = ∆max, it means that we are the best choice for the upstream node u in terms of a positive surplus of hop counts towards destination. Therefore, we should strive to win the auction by becoming as aggressive as possible in our bid (i.e., to set lower values for the bid to make sure we win the auction). Otherwise, if ∆n ≪ ∆max, we should have very low expectations to win the auction and, therefore, we should not make dramatic changes in our bid for different values of cn. Based on that, we define the parameter an that compares our tightness value with the best tightness value in S(u), i.e., an = ∆n ∆max .
Given the values of the budget Bu and the fine Fu announced by the upstream node u, and since Fu ≤ Bu (according to auction rules), our offered bid O(cn), will be given by a logistic function of the form
where Fu ≤ O(cn) ≤ Bu, i.e., we opt for never making a bid less than the established fine Fu. As it can be seen, the logistic function is centered on cn = 1, and the steepness of the curve is controlled by an.
Finally, if ∆n < 0, we discourage the upstream node from choosing us by setting our bid equal to the budget Bu. Likewise, if there is no competition, i.e., we are the only node reachable by the upstream node, we set our bid to the maximum value Bu, and if ∆n = 0, it means that we are very "tight" and, therefore, we should set our bid to Bu (high risk). Figure 2 shows examples of offered bid curves for different valus of an and cn. Lastly, we define a random instant of time ts in which we transmit our (mandatory) bid for a given advertised RFB. This is because, according to auction rules, there is an auction timeout (AT ) before which everyone who gets an RFB must (mandatorily) transmit its bid. Hence, in order to diminish the chances of having competing nodes that always hear our bids before formulating their own ones (e.g., "sniper-type" of behavior at the closing of an auction), we select a random instant of time ts that is uniformly chosen in the interval [0.5AT, 0.75AT ] to transmit our bid.
Budget-and-Fine Setup Strategy
Once an auction is won, the strategy to set the budget Bn and fine Fn to be announced on an RFB is based on a fixed rule. Given that the upstream node paid us an amount equal to our winner offer O * , the budget Bn and fine Fn will be set to
where the value of 60% and 90% were estimated to be reasonable values that can afford, from time to time, some loss not so high (according to auction rules).
Request-for-Bids Setup Strategy
In order to determine who wins our RFB, we want to consider both the offered price opi and the relative tightness ci of each neighbor i around us (except for the upstream node from whom we received the packet). Based on those values, we want to determine the best neighbor to foward our packet to. The maximum offered price we can receive is our own budget Bn, and the maximum relative tightness cmax is related to the neighbor with the highest tightness value ∆i. In our strategy, we value a high relative tightness more than a good offered price, since we want to guarantee packet delivery as much as possible. Therefore, we need to define a preference function Pn(ci, opi) that translates our preference towards the received bids. Hence, the lowest preference would be given to the node that has ci = 0 and opi = Bn, i.e., Pn(0, Bn) = 0. On the other hand, the highest preference would be given to the one where ci = cmax and opi = 0 (for free). Other interesting cases are Pn(0, 0), where it reflects the case when the node is "tight," but it has offered "free forward", and the case Pn(Bn, cmax) where the node has offered the maximum bid, but it is the best node. If Pn(0, 0) = k1 and Pn(Bn, cmax) = k2, we may set k2 > k1 > 0 to reflect our tendency to favor packet delivery as opposed to earn money. The absolute values k1 and k2 are not important, but their relative magnitudes should translate our relative preference between those scenarios (adjustable according to the game). The equation of a plane that intersects those points can be obtained so that the preference function Pn(ci, opi) is finally defined as
Figure 3 depicts the case for the hypotetical values Bn = 20, cmax = 3, and k1 = 2, and k2 = 3.
Promoting Cooperative Behavior
The original strategy was supplemented with an additional feature as a result of observed competitors' behavior during the MANIAC Challenge event. In fact, considering that i) performance criteria was based on packet delivery ratio and maximum balance above zero, and ii) challenge rules enforced the sending of a bid by every node that could hear an RFB, it was possible to have a situation where the auctioneer could actually announce an RFB with zero budget and, yet, to have his packet disputed by every node in its neigborhood. Hence, in spite of not providing any monetary incentives for other nodes to forward his packet, every single neighbor was forced to participate in a zero-budget auction because of competition rules. Thus, with a zero-budget auction, the auctioneer could make a significant profit based on free work provided by downstream nodes. For instance, the Considering that one of the main goals of MANIAC Challenge 2013 was to find ways of promoting mobile data offloading via customer ad hoc forwarding using handheld devices, and given that customers may not be willing to share their resources if no incentives are given, greedy strategies such as this may actually work against the feasibility of ad hoc networks as a solution to the offloading problem. In fact, if a significant portion of participant nodes adopt greedy strategies, other nodes may realize that it is not worth it to forward someone's else traffic. Consequently, many nodes may leave the ad hoc network, which may cause severe network partitions and compromise the own existence of the network. Therefore, it is important to discourage anyone from performing such practices by signaling, somehow, that such strategies are not acceptable and they are hurtful to the well-being of the network as a whole. Instead, a cooperative behavior should be promoted among nodes, by allowing everyone to obtain some benefit out of their participation in the ad hoc network.
With that goal in mind, we have added another rule as a follow-up to our bidding strategy: it states that if a request for bids with zero budget is announced, and our zerovalued bid (according to Eq. (5)) is chosen as the winner of the auction, the received packet is immediately dropped after its reception. Notice that, since the announced fine is necessarily zero (it cannot exceed the budget and it must be nonnegative), we do not loose any money by not forwarding the received packet. Moreover, by dropping the received packet, we not only frustrate the "work-for-free" strategy set up by the auctioneer, but also force it to pay any fine he has agreed upon with any upstream node. In addition, the resulting "cascade effect" on fine payment imposed on the auctioneer's upstream nodes may cause them to avoid this node as a relay in future auctions. By doing so, we expect that the more nodes discourage such behavior, the less are the chances of having someone acting in a greedy manner. This rule is a way of signaling greedy nodes that they must change their way of announcing RFBs in order to promote a more cooperative behavior and better sharing of resources and monetary gains.
DISCUSSION & LEARNED LESSONS
As mentioned before, unfortunately, all gathered data in the MANIAC Challenge 2013 could not be made publicly available by the organizers. As a result, we could not report on our strategy's performance in the competition. It is worth pointing out that setting up the infrastructure for the event is a challenge by itself, and the organizers have successfully accomplished that. However, being a one-day event, it could not happen without some unexpected setbacks, such as incompatibility of some WiFi drivers and problems with the Android port of OLSR [9] . Hence, a first lesson for future events is to make sure that not only the infrastructure for the competition is working, but also the needed setup for data collection. Events such as this are a great opportunity for gathering "real-world" data, and the research community would greatly benefit if accurate data could be made publicly available for thorough performance evaluations and analysis. Moreover, the collected data might serve as traces for simulations or as a baseline in new designs and evaluations. In particular, the minimum information required for such evaluations would be:
• Timestamp and source ID (i.e., AP) for each generated packet, along with a tag for its identification on the way to destination;
• Timestamp, node ID, and content of announced auction, together with timestamp, node ID, and value of winner bid;
• Timestamp and node ID at reception of a packet (auction winner). Balance and number of packets successfully fowarded to destination by node ID;
• Timestamp, node ID, packet tag, and value of fine if packet is discarded;
• Mobility traces (node locations during every round).
The MANIAC Challenge 2013 focused on evaluating heterogeneous forwarding and bidding strategies based on independent, recursive auctions. Hence, as far as performance evaluation of each strategy is concerned, it is important to point out that strategies were not compared by running the same strategy on every tablet, in a given round. On the contrary, each pair of tablets had a different strategy implemented, and the network operated based on heterogeneous forwarding strategies executed all at the same time. In the competition, both packet delivery ratio and balance above zero were evaluated. Hence, strategies had to deal with both metrics at the same time, by favoring one metric over the other, depending on their individual assessment and goals. For instance, at any moment, if a low packet delivery ratio was detected, a team's strategy could start making very low bids (according to its own rule) to increase the odds of winning more auctions. At the same time, another strategy might prefer to keep a positive balance instead of risking a high fine associated with a given packet. In this case, the node would probably make a high bid to decrease the odds of winning the given auction.
Related to this discussion, it is important to mention that no team designed a strategy based on formal game-theoretic analysis. Apart from the fact that not everyone was familiar with the subject, the competitors who tried this approach have reported that they could not find a game that would fit the challenge rules. In fact, in many game-theoretic studies, it is assumed that all players follow the same strategy (i.e., homogeneous behavior) in order to simplify the analysis and make the problem tractable [10, 11] . Moreover, the proof of equilibrium under complex and heterogeneous strategies is known to be a hard problem. Besides, both cooperative and non-cooperative behavior were in place (tablets from same or opposite teams), and teams were allowed to change their strategies between rounds. Hence, in spite of the appeal to using game theory, it was not an easy task to try to model the dynamics of the MANIAC Challenge 2013 with this tool. Nevertheless, an interesting venue of research is to investigate the performance of individual strategies under homogeneous behavior using the MANIAC Challenge setup. What would be the average performance if all nodes ran a given strategy? Would the gains be fairly distributed among nodes? Would the network be operational or collapse under a given strategy? Also, because the competition involved 12 tablets only (including a pair of "dummy" tablets), the scalability of the offloading architecture was not further investigated. In fact, while the addition of extra nodes would certainly improve geographical coverage and provide higher path redundancy, it might as well degrade link quality and network delay due to channel contention and higher interference. Such an investigation might be of interest to mobile operators, for instance, since data offloading has also been singled out as one of the key solutions to improve communication in crowded events [12] .
Other extensions for future events (or general-purpose testbeds) could be the evaluation of strategies based on packet flows (as opposed to per-packet auctions), and the inclusion of the operator's side of the system, so that comprehensive solutions can be further investigated. The issues of cooperation and incentive mechanisms are also critical in order to make auction-based forwarding schemes feasible with ad hoc networks. It is key that every participant node perceives some level of fairness and "profit sharing" within the network. Otherwise, there will be no point in joining the network. Last, but not least, an important issue to be addressed for large-scale deployment of such solutions is the need for official support of ad hoc mode in Android devices. As of this writing, there is still the need to resort to command-line hacking in order to have the ad hoc mode operational in Android devices. Extensions and evaluations such as these would be instrumental for assessing the actual feasibility of mobile data offloading through wireless ad hoc networks.
CONCLUSIONS
The MANIAC Challenge 2013 has shown that many issues still need to be addressed before data offloading to wireless ad hoc networks becomes a viable solution across many devices and operating systems. However, the richness of application scenarios and creativity of solutions presented in the event suggest that wireless ad hoc networks may help to not only offload the operator's infrastructure, but also to provide smart data pricing schemes and wireless coverage extension.
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